If I were taking over an unmanaged Microsoft Entra ID tenant, I would resist the urge to begin with a sweeping employee MFA or passkey policy. First I would make sure the people able to change access controls can sign in securely, use separate admin identities and recover the tenant if a policy or identity service fails.
Microsoft Entra ID is the identity control plane—the central service for managing identity and access—for Microsoft 365, Azure and an increasing number of third-party applications. A compromised privileged account can let an attacker change access, register an application, weaken a policy or create a route back in. They may not need to defeat endpoint protection or find a server vulnerability.
That puts recovery ahead of sophistication. Passkeys, Conditional Access—which applies policies to sign-ins—and Privileged Identity Management are all worthwhile, but the first change should reduce tenant-wide risk without locking out the people who must fix a bad policy. Start with privileged identities and recovery, then enforce a simple access baseline. It is less glamorous than a full Zero Trust diagram, but far less likely to leave an organisation exposed and unable to administer itself.
What would I secure before anything else?
Begin with accounts that can alter identity, access policy, applications and subscriptions. In a small organisation, that may be only a few people. In a larger one, it includes teams managing Microsoft 365, Azure, security, Exchange, SharePoint and endpoint management. Administrator access is not ordinary office access with a grander title; it is the means by which the rest of the security model can be changed.
The immediate work is deliberately unglamorous: identify every Global Administrator, remove standing membership with no current operational purpose, and make sure each remaining administrator has a separate administrative account. Administrators should not routinely read mail, browse the web and approve document prompts with the same identity that can rewrite Conditional Access.
Before enforcing a policy against administrators, create two cloud-only emergency access accounts. Microsoft recommends that these accounts are permanently assigned the Global Administrator role, kept outside policies that could make them unusable during an outage, protected with strong credentials and tested regularly. They are not a convenience loophole. They are the recovery mechanism when a synchronisation fault, identity-provider failure or overenthusiastic policy blocks normal admins.
That exclusion needs discipline. Emergency accounts should not belong to a named employee, their credentials should be held securely under an agreed procedure, and their use should trigger an alert. An excluded account with an unmonitored password in a drawer is not resilience. It is an attacker’s fallback plan.
Why not start by forcing passkeys for every user?
Because broad authentication change is where dependencies surface. Shared kiosks, older mobile operating systems, remote workers changing phones, specialist applications and helpdesk processes can make a seemingly straightforward passkey rollout more disruptive than the presentation suggests. Passkeys based on Fast IDentity Online 2 (FIDO2) are a phishing-resistant option, but safe enrolment, support and recovery still take planning.
Make phishing-resistant authentication the destination, not necessarily the first universal enforcement point. Give it first to Global Administrators and other high-impact roles, followed by IT staff, finance approvers and users with access to sensitive systems. Conditional Access authentication strengths let an organisation require a particular sign-in standard for selected resources or users, rather than treating every multifactor authentication method as equivalent.
That distinction matters. Conventional multifactor authentication is a major improvement on passwords alone, but convincing proxy phishing and session theft can still undermine it. A passkey or hardware security key changes the calculation because the credential is bound to the legitimate service rather than a reusable code entered into a lookalike page. That is why moving away from SMS and voice methods needs thought rather than a rushed switch-over: Entra ID passkey migrations expose practical compatibility problems.
There is no need to wait for universal passkey adoption before improving the tenant. For most employees, a well-run authenticator-based multifactor authentication (MFA) rollout is a reasonable interim control. Just don’t call it the finished state, especially for privileged accounts.
Which Microsoft Entra ID baseline would I choose for ordinary users?
The answer starts with licensing and complexity. For a very small organisation without Microsoft Entra ID P1, enable Security Defaults unless a documented operational dependency makes that impossible. It is intentionally blunt: it requires MFA registration, protects administrator activity, blocks legacy authentication and blocks device-code flow. That is a meaningful improvement over an unmanaged tenant, without asking the organisation to design a policy estate before it has learnt what it owns.
For an organisation with Entra ID P1, Microsoft 365 Business Premium or a comparable entitlement, choose Conditional Access instead. It takes more planning, but exceptions can be explicit and temporary rather than silently inherited from an all-or-nothing setting. Microsoft’s current licensing guidance places Conditional Access in P1 and above; risk-based Conditional Access and Privileged Identity Management require higher licensing.
Keep the first Conditional Access policies few:
- Require MFA for administrators, preferably using phishing-resistant authentication once those accounts are ready;
- Require MFA for users accessing cloud applications;
- Block legacy authentication protocols that cannot satisfy modern MFA requirements; and
- Block device-code flow where there is no justified dependency.
That is not a complete security architecture. It is a coherent minimum. Don’t begin with a forest of country blocks, named locations, device filters and application-specific exceptions. Those controls can be useful, but they are poor opening moves when nobody has established which applications use old protocols or which users still rely on awkward edge cases.
Blocking legacy authentication deserves early attention because those protocols cannot enforce modern MFA in the normal way. The trap is assuming that “legacy” means “unused”. Multifunction printers, older mail clients, line-of-business applications and scripts can expose the exception list in a hurry. Microsoft’s deployment guidance recommends beginning in report-only mode, reviewing the impact in sign-in logs, then moving to enforcement once the affected dependencies are understood.
How would I avoid locking everyone out?
Treat Conditional Access as production change control, not a dashboard exercise. Build policies in report-only mode with a named test group of representative non-admin users before moving to enforcement. Report-only results appear in Entra sign-in logs, so the team can compare the intended outcome with what the policy would actually have done.
There are four checks worth insisting on before a broad policy goes live:
- Emergency access accounts are excluded from blocking or restrictive policies, and a scheduled test proves that they can still sign in.
- Every affected user group has registered the authentication method the policy will require.
- The service desk has a clear recovery route for lost phones, replaced laptops and users who have not completed registration.
- The organisation has reviewed report-only logs for non-interactive sign-ins, older clients and applications that may fail without presenting a useful error to the user.
Keep administrator policy separate from employee policy. A policy that improves administrator security should not wait because a warehouse scanner or ageing accounts package needs more investigation. Equally, don’t copy an admin policy straight to every user without checking the support consequences.
Microsoft advises testing with a pilot group, using report-only mode and reviewing sign-in logs before enforcement. It sounds obvious. It is still the difference between a controlled rollout and discovering critical dependencies from a Monday morning helpdesk queue.
Where would privileged access management fit in?
Privileged Identity Management, usually shortened to PIM, is the right direction for organisations with Entra ID P2 or the relevant governance entitlement. It can make privileged roles eligible rather than permanently active, so an administrator activates access for a defined period, often with MFA, justification and approval. That reduces permanently powerful sessions and makes privileged activity easier to review.
Don’t make a fully mature PIM design the prerequisite for basic MFA and Conditional Access. That delays controls addressing the most common identity failures. Make it the next major piece of work after the initial access baseline, starting with Global Administrator and the roles that can change authentication methods, applications, Conditional Access and privileged role assignments.
The operational trade-off is plain. PIM adds activation steps and can frustrate teams accustomed to permanent access. That inconvenience is the control working, provided activation is quick enough for routine incidents and emergency accounts remain available for genuine failure scenarios. Microsoft describes PIM as a way to limit standing administrator access, discover who holds privileged access and review it. Those are precisely the problems that tend to hide in long-lived admin memberships.
A mature estate can go further with dedicated privileged access workstations and tightly controlled device requirements. Defer that for most small and mid-sized organisations. It needs device engineering, support capacity and a clear admin workflow. Imposing it before basic identity hygiene is settled is more likely to create workarounds than security.
What would I monitor to know whether the first changes are working?
A security policy is not working merely because its status says “On”. Review these measures during and after the rollout:
- The number of privileged accounts and how many remain permanently assigned high-impact roles;
- Authentication-method registration and the proportion of privileged users using phishing-resistant methods;
- Report-only Conditional Access results, then enforced-policy failures, to identify genuine business dependencies rather than anecdotal complaints;
- Legacy authentication attempts after the block is enabled;
- Sign-ins and audit events involving emergency access accounts; and
- Changes to Conditional Access policies, application registrations, credentials, role assignments and authentication methods.
Microsoft Entra ID provides sign-in logs for authentication attempts and audit logs for directory changes. For a modest tenant, regular review in the admin centre may be enough at first. A business with security operations, compliance obligations or a genuine incident-response requirement should stream relevant logs to a monitoring platform and retain them longer than the default operational window. An investigation that starts after the useful evidence has expired is not much of an investigation.
Session controls also deserve proportionate attention. Strong MFA does not make a stolen browser session harmless. MFA proxy attacks can steal Microsoft 365 sessions after authentication, which is a reminder to protect endpoints, review sign-in detail and avoid treating MFA as the whole identity strategy.
When would I change the order?
A small, cloud-only business with no P1 licensing should move quickly: enable Security Defaults, protect its few admins and establish emergency access. Waiting for a perfect design is usually worse than accepting the limits of a sensible baseline.
A hybrid estate needs more patience around broad enforcement. Directory synchronisation accounts, older protocols and on-premises applications may introduce dependencies a cloud-only tenant does not have. That does not justify leaving privileged accounts on passwords alone. It means separating urgent admin controls from the more careful work of retiring or replacing legacy authentication.
A heavily regulated organisation may move PIM, logging and privileged-device controls earlier, particularly where segregation of duties and audit trails are mandatory. It should still resist using compliance as an excuse for a sprawling policy catalogue nobody can explain. More policies mean a greater need for ownership, version control and regular testing.
For organisations preparing Microsoft 365 Copilot, identity work should precede expectations of productivity gains. Copilot does not invent permissions, but it can make existing oversharing more visible and easier to exploit. Securing access and reviewing privilege is a better first investment than treating AI deployment as a separate project.
So what is the decision?
Use a sequence built around recoverable control of privilege: secure and minimise administrator access; establish and test emergency recovery; apply phishing-resistant authentication to high-impact roles; deploy a small Conditional Access baseline through report-only testing; then extend stronger authentication, PIM and monitoring according to licensing and operational maturity.
This is not the fastest route to a crowded Entra dashboard full of green ticks. It is the route most likely to leave the organisation in a better position after the first month: harder to compromise, less dependent on permanent privilege, and still able to recover when an identity policy behaves differently in production than it did in a planning meeting. For broader configuration detail behind those first changes, these Entra ID controls are worth enabling first.
Sources and further reading
- Microsoft Learn: plan a Microsoft Entra Conditional Access deployment
- Microsoft Learn: manage emergency access admin accounts
- Microsoft Learn: phishing-resistant passwordless authentication deployment
- Microsoft Learn: block legacy authentication with Conditional Access
- Microsoft Learn: Privileged Identity Management documentation
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Entra monitoring and health
- Microsoft Learn: Security Defaults in Microsoft Entra ID
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